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Frank Meyer

essential elements: (1) belief in an objective moral order; (2) political
individualism in opposition to collectivist ideologies; (3) anti-utopianism;
( 4) strict limitation of government power; (5) support for the U.S.
Constitution; and (6) anti-Communism. 6 While different conservative
thinkers placed different emphases in different places, Meyer believed these
elements constituted the core of post-war conservative principles in America.
Meyer's political beliefs were a blend of political libertarianism and
traditionalist conservatism-what would later be dubbed "fusionism." Meyer
advocated a minimal state, but also stressed the importance of virtue in
one's individual life. His most important book, In Defense of Freedom: A
Conservative Credo, was written "to vindicate the freedom of the person as
the central and primary end of political society." 7 Meyer argued that "A
social order is a good social order to the degree that men live as free persons
under conditions in which virtue can be freely realized, advanced, and
perpetuated." 8 A good society requires both a political order in which men
may freely choose, as well as a social order that emphasizes tradition, reason,
and the objective moral order. 9
Meyer's articulation of conservative principles was not universally
accepted. Many prominent conservative thinkers were critical of In Defense
ofFreedom as being too libertarian and individualistic. 10 Nonetheless, Meyer
touched a chord within late-1950s conservatism. By the mid-1960s, it was
generally accepted that Meyer's "fusion" had become "the de facto
consensus" within the conservative movement. 11

"FUSI ONISM"
Unlike many conservatives before and since, Meyer saw no contradiction
between an individualistic political philosophy grounded in reason 12 and a
more traditional conservative emphasis on objective morality, social order,
and the pursuit of virtue. Labeled "fusionism" by Brent Bozell, 13 Meyer's
philosophy simultaneously accepts "The existence of an objective moral
and spiritual order, which places as man's end the pursuit of virtue, and the
freedom of the individual person as a decisive necessity for a good
political order." 14
6
Meyer, "Conservatism and Republican Candidates," National Review, 12 December 1967, reprinted in
The Conservative Mainstream, pp. 14-16. Meyer provided a slightly different, but substantively similar,
formulation of the conservative consensus in his concluding essay to VVhat Is Conservatism? See Meyer,
"Summing Up," VVhat Is Conservatism?, ed. Frank Meyer (New York: Holt, 1964),
229-232.
7
Meyer, "In Defense of Freedom: A Conservative Credo," In Defense ofFreedom
p. 33.
8
lbid., 147-148.
9
Ibid., 80.
10
See George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America: Since 1945 (New York, Basic
Books, 1976), p. 175-176.
11
Ibid., 178. Of course, it is arguable whether Meyer's formulation remains the consensus within the
conservative movement, de facto or otherwise.
12
Meyer would only add the qualification that it was "reason operating within tradition." Meyer,
"Freedom Tradition, Conservatism," p. 19.
13
Dennis, "Foreword," p. xii.
14
Meyer, "Why Freedom," National Review, 25 September 1962, reprinted in In Defense of Freedom and
Related Essays, p. 155.
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Meyer saw freedom as the central political value, as "freedom is essential
to the being of man." 15 For Meyer, man is "a free being who lives between
good and evil, beauty and ugliness, truth and error, and fulfills his destiny
in the choices he makes. "16 Allowing for such individual choice is the primary
purpose of political institutions. Anything less would render individuals
something less than human. The underlying purpose of a free society is to
facilitate the individual pursuit of virtue; "freedom, though it is the end of
political theory and political action, is not the end of men's existence." 17
An individualist at heart, Meyer argued that "all value resides in the
individual," and contrary to some "new conservatives," Meyer argued that
"all social institutions derive their value and, in fact, their very being from
individuals and are justified only to the extent that they serve the needs of
individuals." 18 To hold otherwise was to embrace "the collectivist spirit of
the age," 19 and Meyer had no difficulty labeling other conservatives, such as
Russell Kirk, collectivists. On this basis, some libertarians believed Meyer
was "squarely in the libertarian camp. "20
Unlike some who adopted a similarly minimal view of the state, Meyer
embraced the traditional conservative concern for the state of the human
soul. Meyer accepted that "the achievement of virtue is a just concern." 21
He saw it as the "most important of problems." Nonetheless, Meyer insisted
that the pursuit of virtue was "not a political problem," and certainly "not
the concern of the state." 22 For Meyer, "in the moral realm freedom is only
a means whereby men can pursue their proper end, which is virtue," while
at the same time "in the political realm freedom is the primary end. "23
Contrary to some traditionalist conservatives, Meyer did not define
freedom in terms of the pursuit of virtue or a particular conception of the
good. To the contrary, he wrote "freedom cannot be defined in terms of
the ends that a free person ought to choose, ... freedom, which is the
power to choose, cannot be identified with what is chosen." 24 Virtue, to
have any meaning, has to be chosen freely, but providing for individual
freedom offers no guarantee that individuals will pursue virtue. To the
contrary, Meyer frankly acknowledged that protecting freedom to do right
necessarily requires protecting the freedom to do grievous wrong;
15

Meyer, "In Defense of Freedom," p. 176.
Ibid., 47.
17
Ibid., 127.
18
Meyer, "Collectivism Rebaptized," Freeman, July 1955, reprinted in In Defense of Freedom and Related
Essays, p. 8.
19
Ibid., 13.
20
Murray N. Rothbard, "FrankS. Meyer: The Fusionist as Libertarian Manqu ,"Freedom and Virtue: The
Conservative/Libertarian Debate, ed. George W. Carey (Wilmington, DE: ISI, 1998), p. 137. Despite this
apparent embrace of Meyer, Rothbard, like some other libertarians, became severely critical of Meyer
and other libertarian-oriented conservatives for their support of aggressive anti-Communist measures
during the Cold War, particularly in the context of foreign policy.
21
Meyer, "In Defense of Freedom," p. 127.
22
Ibid.
23
M eyer, "Freedom, Tradition, Conservatism," In Defense of Freedom and Related Essays, p. 24.
24
Meyer, "In Defense of Freedom," p. 69.
16
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freedom can exist at no lesser price than the danger of damnation; and if
freedom is indeed the essence of man's being, that which distinguishes
him from the beasts, he must be free to choose his worst as well as his best
end. Unless he can choose his worst, he cannot choose his best. 25

Virtue is important, indeed it is essential for any good society, but it is not a
concern of political institutions, nor can it be imposed by the state from
above.
The only 'virtue' that can be enforced would be a virtue that consisted in
conforming one's behavior to external dictation. Truly to be able to choose
good and truth requires a freedom which, unfortunately, also makes it
possible for men to choose evil and error. In a word, good and truth
cannot be enforced, because by their essential nature they cannot be made
real in men unless they are freely chosen. 26

If freedom were not an essential condition for the exercise of virtue, "then
moral and spiritual perfection could be taught by rote and enforced by
discipline-and every man of good will would be a saint." 27 Freedom is a
necessary condition for the attainment of virtue, however, and to constrain
freedom is to constrain the pursuit of virtue; "The political enforcement of
the good is only possible if the freedom which men must have to seek the
good is destroyed." 28
Virtue was important to Meyer because he believed in an objective moral
order. Yet virtue was also of practical importance. A society in which
individuals were largely free to do as they please, but lacked virtue, would
be unlikely to sustain itself for long. As Meyer saw things, "the only possible
basis of respect for the integrity of the individual person and for the
overriding value of his freedom is belief in an organic moral order. Without
such a belief, no doctrine of political and economic liberty can stand." 29 A
free society in which individuals no longer sought virtue would not last.
For this reason, it is essential to have institutions-albeit non-governmental
institutions-to promote the virtuous life.
The Fusionist View of Government

In designing a suitable political order, Meyer believed "the key is the
limitation of the power of the state-that is, of the power of some men to
impose their beliefs on other men." 30 The aim of politics is to provide for
"a state capable of maintaining order while at the same time guaranteeing
to each person in its area of government the maximum liberty possible to
him short of his interference with the liberty of other persons." 31 For Meyer,
25 Ibid.,

67.
lbid., 121.
27
Ibid., 71.
28 Ibid., 78.
29
M eyer, "Freedom, Tradition, Conservatism," What Is Conservatism?, reprinted in In Defense of Freedom
and Related Essays, p. 23.
30
M eyer, "Conservatism and Crisis: A Reply to Father Parry," Modern Age, Winter 1962-1963, reprinted
in In Defense of Freedom and Related Essays, p. 180.
31
Meyer, "In Defense of Freedom," p. 98.
26
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this was a prescription for a minimalist state. Meyer believed the state only
need perform three essential functions: (1) protect citizens from violent or
fraudulent assaults (the police power), (2) adjudicate disputes in which
the rights of individuals conflict (the judicial power), and (3) protect citizens
from external threats (the military power) .32 To exercise these powers
effectively requires a state with "a monopoly of legal physical force." 33 Yet
such a monopoly is dangerous. A state with a monopoly on the legitimate
initiation of force has substantial power to suppress freedom. Therefore,
Meyer believed that confining a state to these three essential functions is
necessary even if it seems that additional state responsibilities could enhance
social welfare: "Any activity not absolutely vital to the operation of the state
in its functional capacity can only add further power to what is always a
dangerous, if necessary, measure of power." 34 Unlike some nineteenthcentury classical liberals, upon whose thought Meyer explicitly drew, Meyer
firmly rejected any utilitarian formulation of the proper role of government
and denied any such calculus could justify the state's adoption of additional
responsibilities. 35
Meyer insisted that political institutions be structured so as to check the
natural tendency of state power to increase. Like many conservatives, he
recognized the state's natural tendency to expand at the expense of
individual liberty: "There is in power an impulsion to more power, which
can only be limited by countermeasures." 36 To address this concern, Meyer
endorsed the application of "practical political thinking and action" to
design and maintain a political order with a 'just balance, which limits
government to its legitimate functions while allowing it strength enough to
carry out those functions effectively." 37 This requires the division and
separation of government power.
Since power is the instrumentality of control by men and groups of men
over other men and since in this imperfect world, in the end, the only
check upon power is power, the division of power (both within the political sphere and between the political sphere and other spheres) and unceasing vigilance to keep it divided are the essential safeguards of
freedom. 38

On these grounds, Meyer staunchly defended federalism and the horizontal
separation of powers within the federal government.
To entrust the state with the power of enforcing virtue would be to empower
individuals to enforce their particular vision of virtue. "If the state is endowed
32

Ibid., 99-100.
Ibid., 100.
34
Ibid.
35
In an essay largely defending the work of John Stuart Mill, Meyer wrote, "I am myself prepared to
defend a position more absolute than Mill's, because I assert the right of individual freedom not on the
grounds of utility but on the grounds of the very nature of man and the nature of the drama of his
existence." Meyer, "In Defense of john Stuart Mill," In Defense of Freedom, p. 168.
36
M eyer, "In Defense of Freedom," p. 101.
37
Ibid.
38
Meyer, "Collectivism Rebaptized," p. 8.
33
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with the power to enforce virtue, the men who hold that power will enforce
their own concepts as virtuous." 39 Yet there would be no guarantee that truly
virtuous individuals would long hold the reigns of power. Indeed, there
would be ample reason to suspect otherwise. To hope that those in power
would be prudent and virtuous themselves is "a slender reed on which to
base the defense of freedom integrally necessary to a virtuous society." 40
In a similar vein, Meyer opposed government efforts to restrict speech,
even speech that advocates vicious views, as he recognized the inherent
danger of giving the state the power to act as censor. A demagogue may
perpetuate error, but without the power of the state, he or she cannot
suppress truth. Meyer was not so naive as to believe that truth would always
triumph in the marketplace of ideas. But, he averred, "given a society free
of the power of a totalizing state, truth will survive alongside all the errors
and will outlive each of them. "41
In questions of economics, Meyer was ardently laissez Jaire; "the entire
sphere of economic activity must remain free of political control." 42 Meyer
rejected the idea that economic freedom was separable from political
freedom; rather the former was an aspect of the latter. 43 To grant the
government power to regulate in the economic sphere is to grant it the
power to suppress human freedom in many dimensions. For Meyer, "an
economic system cannot itself be a source of virtue; it can only either inhibit
the possibility of virtue by suppressing the freedom of men or indirectly
conduce to virtue by helping to make men free." 44 The ultimate question in
identifying the extent of government intervention in the economy is "not
whether an economic system 'works,' but, working, what end it subserves." 45
Unlike some conservative thinkers, Meyer was not a "democrat." That
is, he believed freedom consisted in having the ability to make choices and
control one's own life, but not necessarily the ability to participate in the
political process. As he wrote in 1962, "Political freedom can be defined as
freedom from coercion in life, limb, liberty, or property by force or fraud;
it has nothing to do with the ideas, the persuasions, the customs which go
into forming every human person." 46 Putting this in starker terms, Meyer
wrote: "Political freedom emphatically has nothing to do with who governs
or who chooses the governors, but only with the strict limitation of the
powers of the governors, whoever they may be." 47 Democracy and
representative government may serve to limit government power, and
39

Meyer,
Ibid.
41
Meyer,
42
Meyer,
43
Meyer,
44
Meyer,
45
Ibid.
46
Meyer,
47
Ibid.

"Why Freedom," p. 158.

40

"In Defense of Freedom," p. 120.
"Collectivism Rebaptized," p. 8.
"Why Freedom," pp. 160-161.
"In Defense of Freedom," p. 140.
"Why Freedom," p. 160.
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thereby safeguard freedom, but to Meyer they were not goods in and of
themselves.

FEDERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL TENSION
Meyer believed that support for the Constitution, and the governmental
framework it established, was a central component of post-war American
conservatism. In Meyer's view, the story of Western civilization was, in no
small part, about the effort both to provide for individual liberty and advance
to a Judea-Christian notion of objective moral truth. In this regard, the
American system of government devised by the framers represented the
pinnacle ofWestern civilization.
America's founders "established the highest political form the West has
yet created to express the tension of transcendent truth and human
freedom," Meyer wrote. 48 America was not perfect-Meyer was no utopianbut it came closer than any society before or since. In America "for the first
time a polity was established based upon the freedom of the person as its
end and upon firm limitation of the powers of the state as the means to
achieve that end." 49 At the same time, America's founders were aware that
liberty alone was insufficient for human flourishing. Virtue was also
necessary for a successful polity. The American Constitution, as originally
written, "was the closest that human beings have come to establishing a
polity which gives the possibility of maintaining at one and the same time
individual liberty, underlying norms of law, and necessary public order." 50
While he did not often write about constitutional law, as such-let alone
federalism as a doctrine-Meyer repeatedly celebrated the Constitution's
"fundamental guarantee" of individual liberty "established by a compact
between sovereign states in a Constitution of divided powers." 51 For Meyer,
American political history "is the history of the exalted attempt, through
the Constitution in its original form, to establish for the first time in human
experience political mechanisms to guarantee the liberty of the individual
person by limiting the power of government." 52 Meyer proclaimed
"American freedom has been based not upon abstract precepts enforced
without regard to circumstance, but upon a constitutional structure, created
to limit power and thus preserve and extend liberty." 53
48
Meyer, "The Separation of Powers," National Review, 30 January 1962, reprinted in The Conservative
Mainstream, p. 56.
"In Defense of Freedom," p. 149. Meyer also wrote, "The principle that the political order
must be
order if men are to have maximum possibilities of achieving virtue is, I maintain, inextricably
linked, in the tradition of the West and the tradition of the American Republic, with the principle that
the
of men is virtue." Meyer, "Why Freedom," p. 162.
"Conservatism," Left, Right and Center: Essays on Liberalism and Conservatism in the United States,
ed. RobertA. Goldwin (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967) reprinted in In Defense ofFreedom and Related Essays,
p. 195.
51
Meyer, "Other-Directed Champion of Other-Directed Court," National Review, 24 August 1957,
reprinted in The Conservative Mainstream, p. 176.
52
Meyer, "Lincoln Without Rhetoric," National Review, 24 August 1965, reprinted in The Conservative
Mainstream, p. 471.
53 Meyer, "Other-Directed Champion," p. 177.
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He saw the structural provisions of the Constitution as the most important
guarantors of individual liberty, insofar as they served to divide and separate
government power, and set branches of government against each other.
Echoing James Madison's description of the "double security" afforded by
a "compound republic," 54 Meyer saw that the Constitution created "a state
of tension between all the political centers of power so that effective final
power rests in none of them." 55 Meyer also echoed Alexander Hamilton's
observation that power is "almost always the rival of power," and therefore
each level of government will "check the usurpations" of the others. 56 The
tension inherent in the constitutional design would ensure "no political
body in the constitutional structure could accrete to itself sovereign power. "57
Liberty was not to be protected by an overweening federal government, let
alone the federal judiciary, but by the preservation of this "tension" between
various divisions and levels of government. Federalism, in particular, would
limit the accumulation of power. Even as the federal government expanded
well beyond its original limits, "local centers of power" would "maintain a
large measure ofindependence."58
Meyer celebrated the founders, and often appealed to their writings for
support. Yet his view of federalism went beyond the conception articulated
in The Federalist and other contemporary writings to embrace a more radical
endorsement of state sovereignty as against federal power. To Meyer, "The
genius of the American Constitution rests in the institutionalization of the
limitation of power, in the division of power so that it is held by a number of
separate and distinct organs." 59 This was particularly important to Meyer as,
in its essential form, conservatism "resists the growth of monopoly power,
usually exercised by the state, which suppresses or distorts the exercise of
free will by individual persons." 60 Yet the division of power was not simply a
matter of institutional design. Meyer believed sovereignty itself was divided
among the federal and state governments, insofar as sovereignty existed at
all. This division of authority, in Meyer's view, necessarily entailed the
distribution of"authority to interpret the Constitution itself." 61 In other words,
all three branches of the federal government, as well as the state governments,
had the authority-if not a responsibility-to interpret the Constitution.
Alas, Meyer lamented, the political order established at the founding
was not "self-enforcing" 62 and did not last. Within several decades, "a process
54

The Federalist, No. 51.
Meyer, "Lincoln Without Rhetoric," p. 471.
The Federalist, No. 28.
57
Meyer, "Lincoln Without Rhetoric," p. 471.
58 Meyer, "The Attack on the Congress,' National Review, 11 February 1964, reprinted in The Conservative
Mainstream, p. 158.
59
Meyer, "The Constitutional Crisis," National Review, 26 October 1957, reprinted in The Conservative
Mainstream, pp. 178-79.
60 Meyer, "The Separation of Powers," p. 55.
61 Meyer, "The Constitutional Crisis," National Review, 26 October 1957, reprinted in The Conservative
Mainstream, p. 179.
62 Meyer, "The Court Challenges the Congress," National Review, 24 March 1964, reprinted in The
Conservative Mainstream, p. 164.
55
56
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of retrogression set in" whereby political power became centralized and
state control over individual activity expanded. 63 Meyer saw a federal
government increasing its power and authority at the expense of the states.
At the same time, unlike some contemporary conservatives, Meyer was
concerned that the judiciary and the executive were seizing power that
properly belonged in the hands of Congress. 64 Meyer identified several
events that contributed to this trend, including the advent of mass democracy
by Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln's assault on "the sovereignty of the
several states," and, most significantly, the explosion of collectivism under
Franklin D. Roosevelt: 55
The calamitous socialization which has descended upon these United States
in the years since 1932 is grounded in the very situation against which the
framers of our Constitution sought to guard: the use of government to
impose upon men positive rules of action. 66

Meyer was harshly critical of the expansion of federal power under FDR,
but not apocalyptic. Even after the New Deal, Meyer wrote, some
constitutional limits on federal power "stand firm, if battered. "67

STATES' RIGHTS AND CIVIL RIGHTS
During Meyer's career, one issue brought issues of federalism and the
balance of power between the state and federal governments to the fore
more than any other: civil rights. Like many conservatives of this era, Meyer
was not particularly sympathetic to calls for federal intervention in southern
states to protectMrican-Americans from state-sponsored discrimination and
Jim Crow. While more explicitly critical of the southern position than some
conservatives, Meyer's devotion to federalist principles was unwavering. He
would not countenance an abandonment of his underlying political
philosophy for even the most noble goals. Meyer argued that "to maintain
that hardships, deprivations, social imbalances are not properly or effectively
solved by state action is not to deny their existence." 68 To the contrary,
Meyer could acknowledge a social injustice, such as state-sponsored racial
segregation, and nonetheless oppose federal efforts to address it. As
historian George Nash observed in another context, "When it came to
matters of principle, Meyer would nofyield an inch." 69
"In Defense of Freedom," p. 149.
is some irony in Meyer's solicitude of Congress for, as already noted, he was tepid in his
endorsement of democracy. This is likely explained, at least in part, by the historical context. At the time
Meyer wrote, the judiciary and executive could have appeared to be a greater threat to federalism and
divided powers than the Congress. Today, the judiciary is more solicitous of the states (at least in some
contexts), while Congress is more likely to aggrandize federal power.
65
Meyer, "In Defense of Freedom," p. 149.
"Freedom, Virtue, and Government," National Review, 12 October 1957, reprinted in The
l,nr;~senJau<ueMainstream, p. 52.
67
Meyer, "The Attack on the Congress," p. 158.
"Conservatism," p. 203.
p. 172.
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Meyer praised U.S. Senator Barry Goldwater for distinguishing "the
problem of states' rights from the problem of civil rights, vindicating the
classical constitutional doctrine of state sovereignty while simultaneously
supporting the enforcement of specifically asserted constitutional rights,
such as the right to vote." 70 He criticized civil rights activists for advocating
"federal enforcement of special group privileges" over the "equal treatment
and dignity before the law" to which all groups are entitled. 71 The Civil
Rights Act of 1964, in particular, threatened to "destroy the constitutional
balance of power and center control over the lives of citizens in the hands
of the chosen instruments of Liberalism, the Executive and a subservient
Supreme Judiciary." 72 Meyer believed the federal government had a
legitimate role in protecting federal constitutional rights, but could not
legitimately impose just outcomes on state governments. The federal
government was not justified in ending racial discrimination through
legislative fiat, even if it could. 73 Not all of the commands of morality and
justice authorized federal power. 74
Meyer was also critical of Brown v. Board of Education. 75 For him, the
problem with Brown was less the result-Meyer held no brief for forced
segregation-than the method used to achieve it. Meyer was concerned
about the Supreme Court's assertion of federal power over state authorities
and local school districts, as well as what he viewed as the Court's reliance
on social science and other unprincipled modes of judicial reasoning. In
Brown, Meyer wrote, the Court "boldly usurped the legislative powers
reserved by the Constitution to the Congress and the legislatures of the
several states, and promulgated a dictate affecting the lives of individual
citizens, the sovereignty of the states, and the prerogatives of the Congress. "76
To its detriment, the Court "based its decision not on moral truth and
constitutional prescription" but "largely upon the expertism of half a dozen
sociologists and psychologists." 77 Writing in 1956, Meyer trained his sights
on the basis for the Court's unanimous holding, and the "sociological
jurisprudence" he believed it represented, rather than on the Court's specific
answer to "the complex problem of desegregation." 78 To Meyer, Brown was
emblematic of a series of judicial "usurpations," as was Baker v. Carr/ 9 in
70
Meyer, "A Man of Principle," National Review, 23 April 1960, reprinted in The Conservative Mainstream,
p. 72.
71
Meyer, "The Attack on the Congress," p. 160.
72
Ibid.
73
Like other conservatives, Meyer was skeptical of the federal government's ability to remedy racial
injustice through fiat.
74
It is worth noting that, to Meyer, school desegregation was not a "civil right ... protected by the
federal constitution or which is enforceable by the federal government." Meyer, "A Man of Principle," p.
72 (emphasis in original).
75
347 u.s. 483 (1954).
76
Meyer, "The Court Challenges the Congress," p. 163.
77
Meyer, "Confusion in the Court," National Review, 11 January 1956, reprinted in The Conservative
Mainstream, p. 170.
78
Meyer, "Confusion in the Court," p. 170.
79
369 u.s. 186 (1962).
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which the Court "tore from the states their control over their own legislative
processes" by holding that a challenge to disproportionate legislative districts
was a justiciable equal-protection claim. 80
Yet Brown was only the beginning. Meyer believed President Dwight D.
Eisenhower's decision to enforce the Supreme Court's decision in Cooper v.
Aaron81 ordering school desegregation in Little Rock, Arkansas, created an
actual "constitutional crisis." 82 Both the Court and the executive astounded
Meyer with their assertions of federal power. First the Supreme Court
declared that it, and it alone, was the supreme expositor of constitutional
interpretation. Then President Eisenhower forced the states-and by
extension the people-to conform to the Court's will at the point of a bayonet.
This action, in Meyer's view, threatened the entire constitutional order.
"With this Diktat the laws of the State of Arkansas and the prerogatives of
the Congress go crashing to the ground, together with all constitutional
limitations upon centralized and concentrated governmental power." 83
Challenging judicial supremacy was more important to Meyer than a
prompt end to state-sponsored school segregation. Meyer did not challenge
the idea of judicial review, but he rejected the notion that the Supreme
Court has a monopoly on constitutional interpretation. The executive's
embrace of the Court's determination that it, and it alone, has the final
word on constitutional interpretation and is the supreme expositor of the
Constitution challenged the "settled tradition of the Constitution" that the
branches of the federal government, as well as state governments, are equally
"vested" with the right of constitutional interpretation. 84 Where there are
"profound differences" of interpretation, in Meyer's view, "the Constitution
clearly envisages a suspension of decision, since no member of the complexly
articulated series of constitutional sovereignties can legitimately be forced
by another member to accept its version of the Constitution." 85 It was not
that Meyer sought to defend segregation-his writings avoided any defense
of such policies-but he did not believe such injustice could justify such an
assertion of federal power.
Like john C. Calhoun, Meyer defended the states' resort to interposition
or nullification to reassert their constitutional prerogatives, and suggested
that states reassert control over their militias so as to prevent "'federalization'
on Presidential whim." 86 Meyer embraced the constitutional views of his
National Review colleague James]. Kilpatrick,87 and his articulation of the
"simple rational and moral truth that the Constitution is a compact between
"The Court Challenges the Congress," p. 164.
1 (1958).
"The Constitutional Crisis," p.178.
84

Ibid.,179.
Ibid.
86
Ibid.,l80.
87
See James J. Kilpatrick, The Sovereign States: Notes of a Citizen of Virginia (Chicago: H. Regnery Co.,
1957).
85
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the states." 88 To reassert the federalist balance, Meyer claimed, it was
necessary for the states to "meet the federal government as an equal." 89 To
those who thought such a position might be viewed as radical or extreme,
Meyer appealed to Thomas jefferson and the power of nullification asserted
in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions. To Meyer, asserting a state's power
to nullify an unconstitutional federal act was no more radical than the
Supreme Court's assertion of superior interpretive power and abandonment
of constitutional principle.
While Meyer was no doubt opposed to most federal efforts to overcome
segregation in the South, he did not turn a blind eye to the injustices of
segregation and Jim Crow. Unlike some conservatives of the time, Meyer
acknowledged the "undoubted wrong suffered by American Negroes and
the undoubted justice of their aspirations." 90 At the same time, he was
harshly critical of the civil rights movement's efforts to induce federal action
to end public and private segregation. The "profound wrongs" suffered by
Mrican Americans throughout American history, injustices that Meyer
acknowledged continued to the then-present time, did not justify such
actions; "these wrongs cannot be righted by destroying the foundations of
a free constitutional society, which is indeed the only basis upon which a
joint and lasting solution of their problems is possible." 91 While affirming
the "innate value of every created human being," and each American's
constitutional right to equal treatment under the law, Meyer sternly objected
to measures that diminished state sovereignty or produced new expansions
of federal power.
Meyer was particularly concerned that the push for civil rights would
result in the further centralization of political power and in the disruption
oflong-standing political and social institutions that help to maintain order,
including federalism. Not only did Meyer express skepticism that the civil
rights movement would achieve its stated policy goals, he also feared they
could have "revolutionary" implications for societal institutions and
disastrous long-term consequences. "A free constitutional order is a
precarious civilizational growth," he warned. "Once riven asunder, it is not
easily attained again." 92 Meyer feared that the "revolutionary methods" of
the civil rights movement, including the use of nonviolent protest and broad
calls to action, threatened that constitutional order.
It was one thing to defend the principle of state sovereignty and the
decentralization of government power. It was quite another to defend
segregation, as such, or even to "cloak racial segregation in the language of
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constitutionalism," 93 as Meyer and the editors of National Review believed
George Wallace did in his 1968 presidential campaign. Although no great
fan of Richard Nixon, Meyer did not view Wallace as an acceptable
alternative. 94 Meyer labeled Wallace a "populist demagogue," whose policy
positions were "alien to the sprit of conservatism." 95 That Wallace attacked
the "naked elitism of the liberals" and appeared to espouse a states' rights
philosophy did not make him a conservative in Meyer's eyes. 96 He had no
more of a place in National Review's conservative movement than the John
Birch Society or the followers of Ayn Rand. 97
Meyer was not always opposed to federal intervention on behalf of
individual liberties. Where the Constitution explicitly guarantees certain
rights, such as the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures,
Meyer believed it appropriate for federal courts to enforce those rights
against the states. Meyer recognized that the protections enumerated in
the Bill of Rights were "affirmed against the states" with the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 98 He also was critical of Supreme Court
decisions that failed to apply such protections consistently, such as in Frank
v. Maryland, 99 in which the Court held 5-4 that health inspectors could
investigate allegedly dilapidated housing without first obtaining a warrant.
Such decisions were devoid of principle in Meyer's eyes, and undermined
the constitutional structure. Indeed, Meyer saw the Court's occasional
willingness to "void" the protections enumerated in the Bill of Rights for
"bureaucratic convenience" as resulting from the same "kind of sociological
generalization and majoritarian expediency" that produced Brown. 100 The
problem was a positivist legal doctrine not rooted in enduring principles.
"Lincoln Without Rhetoric"
Like many conservatives of his time who focused on the growth of
government power, Meyer disparaged the legacy of Abraham Lincoln. While
some conservatives, such as Harry Jaffa, celebrated Lincoln's emancipation
of slaves and embrace of the natural law principles embodied in the
Declaration of Independence, others, including Meyer, saw Lincoln as the
forerunner of the American leviathan. In Meyer's view, Lincoln nationalized
and centralized in the name of union during the Civil War, paving the way
for further accretion of federal power in the decades thereafter. Without
Lincoln, Meyer believed, there would have been no New Deal. Lincoln's
"authoritarianism" during the Civil War "was, in terms of civil liberties, the
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most ruthless in American history," Meyer wrote, provoking a debate with
Jaffa, among others, in the pages of National Review. 101
Lincoln "vigorously . . . attack [ ed]" the Founder's conception of
government, and thereby threatened American liberty. He "shatter[ed]
the subtle tension of state and national powers" essential to the preservation
of individual liberty and limited government. 102 His obsession with
preservation of the Union above all else served "to consolidate central power
and render nugatory the autonomy of the states. "103 In this way, Meyer
argued, Lincoln paved the way for the New Deal Revolution.
Were it not for the wounds that Lincoln inflicted upon the Constitution,
it would have been infinitely more difficult for Franklin Roosevelt to carry
through his revolution, for the coercive welfare state to come into being
and bring about the conditions against which we are fighting today. Lincoln, I would maintain, undermined the constitutional safeguards of freedom as he opened the way to centralized government with all its attendant
political evils. 104

In Meyer's view, the sovereignty of each individual state was an essential
component of the constitutional design, creating the potential for
secession. 105 Prior to the Civil W~r, and Lincoln's war for union, "no one
knew whether a state could secede as its last sanction, and this was of the
utmost necessity if the federal government were not to grow so strong as to
destroy the tension that guaranteed liberty." 106 This ambiguity discouraged
the exercise of federal power over the states.
The Constitution was silent on this issue precisely in order to maintain
the tension between federal and state power-a tension which could be
broken only by shattering the federal union or by so concentrating power
at the center that separation of powers was fundamentally underminedand with it the genius of the Constitution in its defense of liberty. 107

The very threat of secession itself represented a potential check on federal
power. 108 This tension served to restrain the assertion of federal power, and
thereby protected individual liberty.
Though Lincoln may have been responsible for ending the profound
injustice of chattel slavery, Meyer noted that Lincoln's Civil War aim was
the preservation of the Union, not abolition. In that regard, the
centralization of federal power was more intricately tied to Lincoln's aims
than freeing Mrican-American slaves. Allowing several southern states to
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secede would have preserved the essential elements of the federalist structure
and the dual security it afforded individual liberty-albeit at the cost, at least
temporarily, of a shrunken nation and slavery's perseverance in the South.
In Meyer's view, Lincoln erected a "repressive dictatorship" and "wage [d]
the war" pursuing "the permanent destruction of the autonomy of the
states." 109 Worse, Lincoln was "the creator of concentrated power, the
President who shattered the constitutional tension." 110 This was anything
but a consensus view within the conservative movement, however. Mter
National Review ran Meyer's first Lincoln critique, none other than the
magazine's founder and editor, William F. Buckley Jr., wrote a letter to the
editor defending Lincoln and suggesting Meyer's attacks were "close
to blasphemy. "lll

CONCLUSION: FUSIONISM & FEDERALISM
For Meyer, the freedom to do right-to pursue the virtuous life and live
according to the moral commands of the Judeo-Christian religion-must
also entail the freedom to do wrong. "Unless men are free to be vicious,
they cannot be virtuous." 112 While freedom is no guarantee of virtuous
conduct, to Meyer it was a necessary precondition for virtue. Freedom,
even the freedom to do wrong, serves to facilitate the pursuit of virtue.
In much the same fashion, Meyer viewed federalism, in particular the
division of government authority between the federal and state governments,
as a necessary precondition for limited government. Creating an
institutional structure that ensures tension, and perhaps even conflict,
between different orders of government does not ensure that government
power will be constrained, but without such an institutional structure, the
expansion of government at the expense of individual liberty is certain.
Thus, the virtue of federalism for Meyer is not that it ensures sound policy.
Just as individual freedom to do right encompasses the freedom to do wrong,
the freedom afforded states by a decentralized institutional structure
includes the freedom to do wrong, even grievous wrong as in the case of
segregation and Jim Crow. Yet there is little reason to believe that a unified
federal government will, on the whole, adopt superior policy measures.
The argument for federalism is that it provides an institutional structure
that limits the growth of government power and facilitates the adoption of
efficient policies.
This argument for federalism is congruent with Meyer's argument for
individual liberty. Maximizing individual freedom within a state does not
guarantee virtuous conduct. To the contrary, it may allow many individuals
to lead barbarous and venal lives. Yet the state which provides for the
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maximum degree of individual liberty is also providing the greatest
opportunity for individuals to pursue and attain virtue in their lives.
Frank Meyer did not have a particularly detailed, sophisticated, or
nuanced view of American federalism. His positions were based on his
appreciation of the federal Constitution's structure and the Founders'
design. Yet his brand of federalism was neither fully grounded nor wholly
consistent. Meyer's view of state sovereignty, including his embrace of
nullification and interposition, owed more to the thought of Calhoun than
to Madison or Hamilton. Whatever its other merits, the view that states
could nullify purportedly unconstitutional federal acts is a marginal view in
the American constitutional tradition. It also conflicts with Meyer's
acceptance of incorporation. If states could resist those federal acts, the
constitutional basis of which they reject, then it would be quite difficult for
the federal government to protect constitutional rights from state action.
Meyer's views of federalism also seem to be a product of his time. Beyond
the struggles over civil rights, he had little cause to explicate the details of
federalism at any length. As a result, Meyer was extremely sensitive to federal
encroachments initiated by the executive or the judiciary. On the other
hand, he expressed little concern about Congress' power to expand federal
authority at the expense of the states. To the contrary, Meyer thought
defending congressional power would protect the autonomy of the states.
Several decades after Meyer's passing, this view seems quaint, if not naive.
Few conservatives today would neglect the federal legislature's role in
expanding federal power over matters traditionally left in state hands.
Despite the incompleteness and inconsistency of Meyer's articulation of
federalist principles, he recognized the importance of divided and separated
power for the protection of individual freedom and the maintenance of
limited government. The constitutional structure of federalism, and the
tensions it produced, served Meyer's preeminent goal of facilitating the
pursuit of virtue through the preservation of freedom in a minimalist state.
In this sense, federalism and fusionism fit together. Federalism is one part
of the institutional structure that can allow for-but will not guarantee-the
implementation of the ideal state, and provide the context for a society of
free and responsible individuals. It is thus understandable why Frank Meyer
the fusionist would also be Frank Meyer the federalist.

